Enforcement of international mediated settlements without the Singapore convention on mediation by CHUA, Eunice
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
8-2019 
Enforcement of international mediated settlements without the 
Singapore convention on mediation 
Eunice CHUA 
Singapore Management University, eunicechua@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Citation 
CHUA, Eunice. Enforcement of international mediated settlements without the Singapore convention on 
mediation. (2019). Singapore Academy of Law Journal. 31, 572-597. Research Collection School Of Law. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3090 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
 (2019) 31 SAcLJ 572  
 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATED 
SETTLEMENTS WITHOUT THE SINGAPORE 
CONVENTION ON MEDIATION 
This article considers how international mediated settlement 
agreements can be enforced without the Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation (“Singapore Convention on Mediation”). 
Although the Singapore Convention on Mediation represents 
an important contribution to facilitate resolution of cross-
border disputes through mediation, it will take time before 
there are enough signatories to make a significant impact. 
Additionally, in deciding whether or not to become a 
signatory to the Singapore Convention on Mediation or to 
opt out of it if given the option, jurisdictions and potential 
users of mediation will need to be aware of what the available 
alternatives are. This article discusses these alternatives, 
taking into account common law, civil law and other 
international instrument approaches to enforcement. 
Eunice CHUA* 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
CEO, Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre; 
Research Fellow, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 Because mediated settlement agreements are entered into 
voluntarily by the parties instead of imposed on them by a third-party 
ruling, they have a higher chance of performance compared with court 
decisions.1 Nevertheless, the parties may still wish to or find it necessary 
to create an enforceable agreement, for example, if the obligations 
agreed on are far in the future or if the parties have some specific need 
for reassurance whether for financial, emotional or other reasons. 
Additionally, the parties may be wary of the temptation to delay or 
                                                          
* I wish to thank my family for their wonderful support that allowed me to work on 
this piece and my former student, Keith Toh Ian Ray, for his helpful research 
assistance. I am also deeply appreciative of Professor Nadja Alexander and 
Professor Joel Lee for the opportunity to be part of this special edition and for their 
helpful comments on the piece. 
1 Edna Sussman, “The Final Step: Issues in Enforcing the Mediation Settlement 
Agreement” in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: 
The Fordham Papers 2008 (Arthur W Rovine ed) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009) at p 344; Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Thomson Reuters, 
4th Ed, 2012) at p 382, citing empirical research from Stephen Goldberg et al, 
Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes (Little Brown and 
Co, 2nd Ed, 1992) at p 8. 
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refuse performance or changes in circumstances that could affect 
compliance.2 This need for enforceability is probably most acute in the 
international mediation context, where parties from different cultures 
and jurisdictions may not necessarily have a long-standing or robust 
relationship of trust. Complications in the enforcement of international 
mediated settlement agreements further add to the uncertainty and 
transaction costs of resolving an international dispute through 
mediation.3 
2 For these reasons, many proponents of mediation see 
enforceability as a missing piece that could have a significant impact on 
the use of international mediation.4 This view is supported by a large 
number of empirical research studies. In the Global Pound Conference 
Survey conducted from 2016 to 2017, delegates were asked about the 
areas that would most improve commercial dispute resolution. The top 
choice (51%) was the use of legislation or conventions that promote 
recognition and enforcement of settlements, including those reached in 
mediation.5 A survey published in 2016 and conducted by Stacie Strong 
showed that enforcement of international mediated settlement 
agreements was perceived as significantly more difficult than domestic 
mediated settlement agreements.6 When asked to indicate whether they 
thought the existence of an international convention concerning the 
enforcement of settlement agreements arising out of international 
commercial mediations would encourage parties in the respondent’s 
                                                          
2 Chang-Fa Lo, “Desirability of a New International Legal Framework for Cross-
Border Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2014) 
7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 119 at 126–127. 
3 Chang-Fa Lo, “Desirability of a New International Legal Framework for Cross-
Border Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2014) 
7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 119 at 127–128. 
4 Edna Sussman, “A Path Forward: A Convention for the Enforcement of Mediated 
Settlement Agreements” (2015) 6 TDM 1; Laurence Boulle, “International 
Enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements: Developing the Conceptual 
Framework” (2014) 7 Contemp Asia Arb J 35; Dorcas Quek Anderson, Nadja 
Alexander & Anna Howard, “UNCITRAL and the Enforceability of iMSAs: The 
Debate Heats Up – Part 3” Kluwer Mediation Blog (22 September 2016); David 
Weiss & Brian Hodgkinson, “Adoptive Arbitration: An Alternative Approach to 
Enforcing Cross-Border Mediation Settlement Agreements” (2014) 25 Am Rev 
Int’l Arb 275; Ellen E Deason, “Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in 
International Commercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?” (2015) 
22(1) Disp Resol Mag 32 at 32; Chang-Fa Lo, “Desirability of a New International 
Legal Framework for Cross-Border Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement 
Agreements” (2014) 7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 119. 
5 The next closest option (47%) was the use of protocols promoting non-adjudicative 
processes before adjudicative processes. Herbert Smith Freehills, PwC & the 
International Mediation Institute, “Global Pound Conference Series: Global Data 
Trends and Regional Difference” (2018) at p 14 <https://www.globalpound.org>. 
6 Stacie I Strong, “Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International 
Commercial Mediation” (2016) 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 1973 at 2051. 
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home jurisdiction to use mediation, a majority of 74% of the 
respondents thought that such an international instrument would 
encourage mediation.7 
3 Building on Strong’s survey, another survey adopting the same 
methodology had 84% of respondents selecting “yes” when asked 
whether they would be more likely to use or increase use of mediation in 
a cross-border dispute with another party or multiple parties of different 
jurisdictions if a uniform global mechanism was in place similar to the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards8 (“New York Convention”) to enforce a settlement agreement 
reached in the mediation process.9 In a 2014 survey conducted by the 
International Mediation Institute, 90% of respondents agreed that the 
absence of any kind of international enforcement mechanism for 
international mediated settlement agreements presented a major 
impediment or was at least one deterring factor to the growth of 
mediation as a mechanism for resolving cross-border disputes, and 93% 
indicated they would be likely to mediate a dispute with a party from a 
country that ratified an international convention on the enforcement of 
mediated settlements.10 
4 The desire to promote enforceability of international mediated 
settlement agreements has been expressed and considered in the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
before, including during the preparation of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Conciliation 200211 (“the Model Law”). 
Many “practitioners had put forward the view that the attractiveness of 
conciliation would be increased if a settlement reached during a 
                                                          
7 Stacie I Strong, “Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International 
Commercial Mediation” (2016) 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 1973 at 2055. 
8 330 UNTS 3 (10 June 1958; entry into force 7 June 1959). 
9 David S Weiss & Michael R Griffith, “Report on International Mediation and 
Enforcement Mechanisms: Issued by the Institute for Dispute Resolution (IDR) 
NJCU School of Business to the International Mediation Institute for the Benefit of 
Delegates Attending the UNCITRAL Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) 
67th Session” (2017) at pp 16–17. 
10 International Mediation Institute, “IMI Survey Results Overview: How Users View 
the Proposal for a UN Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” 
https://www.imimediation.org/2017/01/16/users-view-proposal-un-convention-
enforcement-mediated-settlements (accessed 15 January 2019). 
11 GA Res 57/18, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 57th Session 
(19 November 2002). The Model Law has since been amended and renamed the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation 2018 GA 
Res 73/199, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018). 
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conciliation would enjoy a regime of expedited enforcement”.12 The 
UNCITRAL also expressed that it was “generally in agreement with the 
general policy that easy and fast enforcement of settlement agreements 
should be promoted”.13 However, due to the great variance in the 
methods of achieving enforcement of settlement agreements between 
legal systems, the Commission ultimately left the issues of enforcement, 
defences to enforcement and the designation of authorities from whom 
enforcement could be sought to applicable domestic law. Accordingly, 
Art 14 of the Model Law provided that: 
If the parties conclude an agreement settling a dispute, that settlement 
agreement is binding and enforceable … [the enacting State may 
insert a description of the method of enforcing settlement agreements 
or refer to provisions governing such enforcement]. 
5 Following the Model Law, the next attempt to achieve some 
success in harmonising the enforcement of international mediated 
settlement agreements took place at the regional level in the European 
Union (“EU”). In the EU Mediation Directive,14 Art 6 obliged member 
states to enforce a written settlement agreement resulting from cross-
border mediation if all parties so requested and left the member states to 
implement this obligation based on procedural mechanisms of their 
choice. Unfortunately, the success of the EU Mediation Directive has 
been limited.15 A study requested by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs has observed that the EU Mediation 
Directive has done little to solve the “EU Mediation Paradox” – “Despite 
its proven and multiple benefits, mediation in civil and commercial 
matters is still used in less than 1% of the cases in the EU.”16 The broad 
formulation of Art 6 has also led to not only the procedure but also the 
issues surrounding enforcement, including available defences to 
                                                          
12 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Draft Guide to 
Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation (A/CN.9/514) (27 May 2002) at para 77. 
13 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to 
Enactment and Use GA Res 57/18, adopted at the United Nations General 
Assembly, 57th Session (19 November 2002) at para 88. 
14 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
15 Leonardo D’Urso, “A New European Parliament Mediation Resolution Calls on 
Members States and the EC to Promote More Use” (2018) 36(2) Alt to High Cost 
of Lit 19; Eunice Chua, “The Future of International Mediated Settlement 
Agreements: Of Conventions, Challenges and Choices” (2015) Tan Pan Online: 
A Chinese-English Journal on Negotiation 1. 
16 With Italy as an exception due to the introduction of a form of mandatory 
mediation. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C (Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs), “Rebooting” the 
Mediation Directive: Assessing the Limited Impact of Its Implementation and 
Proposing Measures to Increase the Number of Mediations in the EU (by Giuseppe 
De Palo et al) (PE 493.042, 2014) at p 1. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
576 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2019) 31 SAcLJ 
 
enforcement, being left to the domestic law of each of the EU member 
states. 
6 Enter then the Convention on International Settlement 
Agreements Resulting from Mediation17 (“Singapore Convention on 
Mediation”), which was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 20 December 2018. It signifies remarkable progress in the 
international community’s acceptance of mediation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism and a desire to see its use grow. Completed 
within four years despite the many sceptical views expressed at the first 
proposal for such a convention at a meeting of UNCITRAL Working 
Group II,18 the Singapore Convention on Mediation will allow parties to 
enforce an international mediated settlement in signatory states directly, 
akin to how the New York Convention allows the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards. It addresses 
the key issues surrounding the enforcement of international mediated 
settlement agreements but stops short of prescribing an enforcement 
procedure.19 
7 Although reception to the Singapore Convention on Mediation 
has been warm,20 it will take time before there are enough signatories to 
make a significant impact on the practice of international businesses. 
The New York Convention, now lauded as the most significant 
instrument in international arbitration, had 80% of the countries in the 
                                                          
17 GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018). 
18 See Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework 
for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” 
(2019) 19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 5: 
The project did not get off to an auspicious start. Based on the first day of 
discussion in the Working Group, the chair assessed that the group did not 
have a great prospect of arriving at consensus on the desirability of work on 
this topic. Sobering views dominated the discussion, e.g., a prediction that 
development of a convention would take many years, and fears that even if 
UNCITRAL did spend years working on the project, that work would be no 
more successful than prior efforts to address the issue in the context of 
UNCITRAL’s development of the Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation … 
19 See Eunice Chua, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation – A Brighter Future 
for Asian Dispute Resolution” (2019) Asian J Int’l Law (forthcoming) for a 
commentary. 
20 See, eg, Patrick R Kingsley, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: Good News 
for Businesses”, The Legal Intelligencer (9 January 2019); Christian Schmitt, 
Alexandros Chatzinerantzis & Jane Larner, “The ‘Singapore Convention’: The Way 
Forward in International Mediation?” Lexology (31 July 2018); “UN Treaty on 
Mediation to Be Named after Singapore” Business Times (24 July 2018); and Ben 
Giaretta, “The Singapore Mediation Convention: A Game Changer?” Mishcon de 
Reya (28 August 2018). 
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world as signatory states as at 2018.21 However, it should be remembered 
that “the international business community’s penchant for international 
arbitration developed relatively recently”,22 and its influence expanded 
gradually as the number of signatory states grew at an average rate of 
between two and three states each year.23 
8 Additionally, for countries deciding whether or not to become a 
signatory to the Singapore Convention on Mediation or for potential 
users deciding whether to opt out of it if given the option, which is a 
possibility permitted by Art 8 of the Singapore Convention on 
Mediation, it is important to be aware of what the alternatives are. This 
article discusses these alternatives, taking into account common law, 
civil law and other international instrument approaches to enforcement. 
It focuses on three generally available options to enforce international 
mediated settlement agreements: (a) as an order of a domestic court; 
(b) as a consent arbitral award; and (c) through notarisation.24 
I. Enforcement as an order of court 
9 If the mediated settlement agreement was arrived at after a 
court action had started, it is possible in many jurisdictions to have the 
court record the settlement agreement as a consent order of court, 
which is generally regarded as a final judgment of the court.25 
Exceptionally, domestic law may permit the courts to enter a judgment 
based on the mediated settlement agreement without starting a civil 
action. Examples include Ontario, Canada, where the Commercial 
                                                          
21 Paula Hodges QC, Peter Godwin & Justin D’Agostino, “60 Years of the New York 
Convention: A Triumph of Trans-national Legal Co-operation, or a Product of Its 
Time and in Need of Revision?” Inside Arbitration (July 2018). 
22 Stacie I Strong, “Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International 
Commercial Mediation” (2016) 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 1973 at 1980, citing Gary 
Born, “A New Generation of International Adjudication” (2012) 61 Duke LJ 775 
at 826–844. 
23 Data on signatories obtained from http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries 
(accessed 15 January 2019). 
24 See generally Edna Sussman, “The Final Step: Issues in Enforcing the Mediation 
Settlement Agreement” in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and 
Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2008 (Arthur W Rovine ed) (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009) at pp 345–359; Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative 
Mediation: Legal Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2009) at pp 301–312; and 
Bobette Wolski, “Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical 
Questions and Directions for Future Research” (2014) 7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 87 
at 95–99. 
25 Bobette Wolski, “Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical 
Questions and Directions for Future Research” (2014) 7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 87 
at 95. 
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Mediation Act 201026 permits the registration of a mediated settlement 
agreement with the Superior Court of Justice and for the agreement to 
have the same force and effect as if it were a judgment of the court; the 
Philippines, where s 17 of the Philippine Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act27 allows the parties to deposit a mediated settlement agreement with 
the appropriate clerk of a Regional Trial Court and for the court to 
summarily hear a petition if a need to enforce the mediated settlement 
agreement arises; and Singapore, where parties may make an application 
to court to have their mediated settlement agreement recorded as an 
order of court subject to certain conditions being satisfied under s 12 of 
Singapore’s Mediation Act.28 
10 Nevertheless, even if some expedited procedure is available for a 
mediated settlement agreement to take the form of a court order, there 
remains the difficulty of international enforcement because a court in 
another country is usually not obliged to recognise the foreign court’s 
judgment unless there are pre-negotiated obligations to enforce in place, 
whether in the form of a multilateral or bilateral agreement.29 The 
discussion in this part examines the enforcement of mediated settlement 
agreements that take the form of a foreign court judgement or order 
under international treaties, regional or bilateral treaties and under 
principles of domestic law. It concludes that although there is promise in 
multilateral treaties for the enforcement of foreign court judgments, the 
reality at present is that parties will have to rely on regional or bilateral 
treaties as well as domestic law. However, because these treaties are 
subject to different conditions, it is difficult to formulate with specificity 
general rules that can guide parties as to when one jurisdiction will 
recognise the orders of court made in another. There is even more 
divergence in terms of the practice of enforcement under a principle of 
domestic law. This leads to uncertainty for international businesses who 
have dealings all over the world and who have counterparts with assets 
all over the world. 
A. International treaties 
11 International treaties are arguably the best tool to bring 
certainty and harmony to the area of enforcement of foreign judgments. 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
                                                          
26 Commercial Mediation Act (SO 2010, c 16, Schedule 3) (Ontario) s 13. 
27 Republic Act No 9285 (2004) s 17. 
28 Mediation Act 2017 (Act 1 of 2017) s 12. 
29 Bobette Wolski, “Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical 
Questions and Directions for Future Research” (2014) 7(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 87 
at 95. 
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Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters30 is an example of an 
international instrument that sought to do this. Unfortunately, it has not 
gained traction, with only five contracting states.31 The Choice of Court 
Convention32 is a more successful multilateral treaty that provides for 
mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements from a court 
that is chosen by the parties pursuant to a choice of court agreement. As 
of 31 December 2018, 31 countries have ratified the Choice of Court 
Convention.33 These are the EU member states, Mexico, Montenegro 
and Singapore. The signatories34 to the Choice of Court Convention are 
China, Ukraine and the US. It is apparent that the geographical spread 
of these countries is limited, even when the signatories are included. In 
particular, there are only two Asian countries, one Latin American 
country, and none from the Middle East and Africa. It is also doubtful 
when the Choice of Court Convention will enter into force in the US, 
which has been a signatory since 2009. Hence, the usefulness of the 
Choice of Court Convention to enforce foreign judgments may be 
constrained until more countries ratify it and bring it into force. 
12 Further, in order for international parties to a mediated 
settlement to take advantage of the Choice of Court Convention, they 
will need to ensure that their agreement to mediate contains a clause 
stipulating an exclusive choice of court before having that court record 
the settlement agreement as a court order. Thus, this mechanism for 
enforcement may not be useful if the parties did not already 
contemplate enforcement in another jurisdiction at an early stage. 
Nevertheless, where recourse to the Choice of Court Convention is 
available, it could be preferred to the Singapore Convention on 
Mediation in certain circumstances: first, where the dispute between 
international parties is civil rather than commercial in nature. This is 
because the Choice of Court Convention applies to civil as well as 
                                                          
30 1 February 1971; entry into force 20 August 1979. 
31 These are Albania, Cyprus, Kuwait, Netherlands and Portugal. See Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, “Status Table” https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=78 (accessed 15 January 2019). 
32 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 2005; entry 
into force 1 October 2015). 
33 Data on ratification status obtained from Hague Conference on Private 
International Law website https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
status-table/?cid=98 (accessed 15 January 2019). 
34 These are countries that have signed the convention thereby expressing their 
intention to comply with the treaty. Signing a treaty obliges a State to refrain in 
good faith from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty but does 
not otherwise bind the State to the terms of the treaty until it is ratified. 
Ratification occurs when a State has taken the necessary steps under its national 
laws to have the treaty take effect domestically and either notifies the other states 
or deposits the treaty with a depositary. See Gideon Boas, Public International Law: 
Contemporary Principles and Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 
at pp 56–57. 
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commercial disputes, unlike the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 
which only applies to commercial disputes.35 Second, to benefit from the 
finality that comes with very limited grounds for non-enforcement. 
Under the Choice of Court Convention, apart from the agreement being 
null and void, a party to the agreement lacking capacity, failure in the 
giving of notice for the institution of proceedings, recognition or 
enforcement being manifestly incompatible with public policy, and 
inconsistency with existing judgments, the only other ground for refusal 
of recognition or enforcement is if the judgment was obtained by 
fraud.36 These grounds for refusal are more restrictive than those 
available under the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which 
arguably includes limbs with more subjectivity, including a “serious 
breach” by the mediator of standards applicable to the mediator or 
mediation, and a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties 
circumstances that “raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s 
impartiality or independence”.37 The Singapore Convention on 
Mediation further permits non-enforcement where this would be 
“contrary to the public policy” of the country where relief is sought, 
which appears to be a lower threshold to satisfy than the Choice of 
Court Convention’s “manifestly incompatible with public policy”.38 
13 Separately, there has also been a revival of the Judgments 
Project by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which 
goes beyond the Choice of Court Convention’s narrow focus on 
international cases involving choice of court agreements and includes all 
judgments in civil and commercial cases where recognition and 
enforcement is sought abroad. The Special Commission on the 
Judgments Project has met multiple times from 2016 to 2018 to discuss 
a draft convention text. Alongside other regional efforts such as the 
Asian Principles of Private International Law,39 and the Commonwealth 
                                                          
35 Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation 
GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018) Art 1. 
36 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 2005; entry 
into force 1 October 2015) Art 9. 
37 Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation 
GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018) Art 5(1). 
38 Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation 
GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018) Art 5(2); cf Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court 
Agreements (30 June 2005; entry into force 1 October 2015) Art 9(e). 
39 Weizuo Chen & Gerald Goldstein, “The Asian Principles of Private International 
Law: Objectives, Contents, Structure and Selected Topics on Choice of Law” (2017) 
13 J Priv Int’l Law 411. 
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Model Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Bill,40 this 
could enhance the international framework for the enforcement of 
foreign judgments in future and support the search for convergence in 
this area. 
B. Regional or bilateral treaties 
14 Two particular regions, Europe and Latin America, have a 
well-developed regional framework for the enforcement of foreign 
judgments. In Europe, the EU countries will mutually recognise and 
enforce the judgments of other EU countries pursuant to the recast 
Brussels I Regulation. Even if the UK exits from the EU and is unable to 
negotiate for continuing mutual recognition and enforcement of EU 
judgments, it should still be able to rely on the Choice of Court 
Convention, which it has acceded to in its own right, although the 
judgments covered by the Choice of Court Convention would be more 
limited. In Latin America, the conventions produced under the aegis of 
the Inter-American Specialized Conferences on Private International 
Law, including the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards41 and the 1984 
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere 
for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments,42 are influential in 
the region as they lay down conditions for enforcement of foreign 
judgments. 
15 In terms of bilateral treaties for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, these vary from country to country and provide an 
uncertain basis to rely on. For example, if enforcement is sought within 
Commonwealth countries, it is likely that there will be mutual 
recognition and enforcement of judgments among these countries 
although this would still depend on the bilateral arrangements between 
the countries in question. To illustrate the lack of complete predictability 
in this regard, if one wished to enforce a judgment from the superior 
courts of Malaysia, Singapore, Aden, Bangladesh, Canada, the Cook 
Islands and the Trust Territories of Western Samoa, Fiji, Hong Kong, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United Arab Emirates and the UK in India, one could do so through 
s 44A of India’s Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.43 If one wished to enforce 
a judgment from the superior courts of the UK and other 
                                                          
40 Commonwealth Secretariat, “Improving the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: 
Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” (2017) 
43(3–4) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 545 at 547. 
41 OAS Treaty Series No 51 (8 May 1979; entry into force 14 June 1980). 
42 OAS Treaty Series No A/39; 24 ILM 468 (24 May 1984). 
43 Act No 5 of 1908. 
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Commonwealth countries in Singapore, including Malaysia, Brunei, 
India (except the State of Jammu and Kashmir), the Commonwealth of 
Australia, and the states of New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory, Norfolk Island and the Northern Territory, one could 
rely on Singapore’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth 
Judgments Act.44 If one wished to enforce a Hong Kong judgment in 
Singapore, one could rely on Singapore’s Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act.45 For non-Commonwealth countries, which are 
usually civil law jurisdictions, this problem is further exacerbated and 
there is no discernible general principle to help ascertain the existence of 
bilateral treaties for mutual recognition and enforcement of domestic 
court judgments. In the Middle East, the close relations between the 
Arab states often means that bilateral treaties exist to permit mutual 
recognition and enforcement of court judgments. Nevertheless, one still 
needs to examine the bilateral treaty in question to ensure that one 
complies with the necessary requirements for enforcement that are not 
common across all treaties. 
C. Domestic law 
16 Absent a treaty, there are some countries that may enforce 
foreign court judgments based on principles recognised by domestic 
law. However, the domestic laws of countries relating to the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments demonstrate great divergence 
and for international commercial disputes, this presents practical 
difficulties. In particular, the conflicts between civil law and common 
law give rise to thorny problems when the same term, such as 
“jurisdiction” or “finality”, may have different meanings, or where 
certain terms may exist in one but not the other, such as “reciprocity”.46 
17 Under common law, it may be possible to enforce a foreign 
monetary judgment through a common law action on a judgment debt, 
which allows the judgment creditor to apply for summary judgment by 
producing the foreign judgment as proof of debt.47 However, these 
procedures for enforcement may not be as swift or inexpensive as they 
appear, as the judgment debtor may use every means to delay 
                                                          
44 Cap 264, 1985 Rev Ed. 
45 Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed. 
46 Jie Huang, “Conflicts between Civil Law and Common Law in Judgment 
Recognition and Enforcement: When is the Finality Dispute Final?” (2011) 
29(1) Wisconsin Int’l L J 479 at 480–481; Recognition and Reinforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Asia (Adeline Chong ed) (Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) at p 4. 
47 Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Lord Collins of 
Mapesbury et al eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) at para 14-011. 
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enforcement and even, if possible, relitigate the original issues.48 
Additionally, even among common law jurisdictions differences still 
exist. The Asian Business Law Initiative project on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments reports that among Asian common 
law jurisdictions that adhere to the English common law framework, 
these jurisdictions differ on, amongst others, whether default judgments 
are final and conclusive in nature, and on the scope of the defence of 
fraud.49 The US presents its own unique set of challenges due to the lack 
of uniformity among state laws.50 
18 The civil law countries also demonstrate disparity. For example, 
in relation to the test for jurisdictional competence of the foreign court, 
this could be tested by reference to the law of the foreign court itself or 
to the law of the forum.51 There are also vastly different approaches to 
recognition and enforcement. Some civil law countries require a treaty 
before a foreign judgment may be recognised and enforced, such as the 
Netherlands and some Scandinavian countries.52 Others do not view the 
existence of a treaty as a necessary requirement but, absent a treaty, 
would be willing to enforce a foreign judgment based on some other 
principle in domestic law, like that of reciprocity. These include China, 
Vietnam, Japan and South Korea. However, it should also be mentioned 
that the principle of reciprocity is not uniformly understood and 
practised in civil law countries.53 Reciprocity could mean that it must be 
shown that at least one of a country’s judgments has been enforced by 
the other country in the past, or, that it is likely that its judgment would 
be enforced by the other country if the other country is called on to do 
so. The strictness in which the test of reciprocity is applied further adds 
to the uncertainty. Finally, there are also some civil law countries that 
even appear not to recognise foreign judgments at all as they require a 
                                                          
48 Commonwealth Secretariat, “Improving the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: 
Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” (2017) 
43(3–4) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 545. 
49 Recognition and Reinforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Adeline Chong ed) 
(Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) at p 3. 
50 Yuliya Zeynalova, “The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It? (2013) 31 Berkley J Int’l Law 150 
at 154. 
51 Recognition and Reinforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Adeline Chong ed) 
(Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) at p 3. 
52 Ralf Michaels, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Rudiger Wolfrum ed) 
(Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 2009) at para 10. 
53 Béligh Elbalti, “Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: A Lot of Bark but Not Much Bite” (2017) 13 J Priv Int’l Law 184. 
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litigant to sue afresh on the same cause of action despite the foreign 
judgment in his favour, such as Indonesia and Thailand.54 
19 Accordingly, enforcing international mediated settlements by 
way of a court order or judgment presents many challenges in the 
international context. Although some are optimistic about the progress 
of the Judgments Project, it will still take time before any convention is 
agreed, signed and ratified so as to come into force. 
II. Enforcement as an arbitral award 
20 Some countries have laws that give mediated settlement 
agreements the same status as arbitral awards. For example, under 
s 73(3) of India’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996,55 a settlement 
agreement signed by the parties is final and binding on them and the 
persons claiming under them and is given the legal force and effect of an 
arbitral award. Similarly, Art 51(2) of the Arbitration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China56 provides that a conciliation statement has the same 
effect as an arbitral award on the merits. However, it is unclear whether 
these provisions would apply to international mediated settlement 
agreements as these are not provided for in the domestic legislation. 
21 The more common way of enforcing international mediated 
settlements as an arbitral award is by combining the mediation and 
arbitration processes. This is most frequently done through mediation-
arbitration (“Med-Arb”),57 arbitration-mediation (“Arb-Med”)58 and 
arbitration-mediation-arbitration (“Arb-Med-Arb”).59 Of these three 
ways of combining processes, a small-scale international study of 
81 participants showed that of the 27 participants (33.3%) that had 
experience with combined processes, Med-Arb and Arb-Med-Arb were 
the most popular, with about three-quarters indicating that they had 
experienced Med-Arb (74.1%) and Arb-Med-Arb (70.4%).60 Arb-Med 
was much less frequently used, with only 25.9% of the participants 
indicating that they had experience with Arb-Med in the sense of 
                                                          
54 Recognition and Reinforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Adeline Chong ed) 
(Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) at pp 3–5. 
55 Act No 26 of 1996. 
56 Promulgated by Order No 31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 
31 August 1994. 
57 This refers to a tiered process where mediation is first attempted before arbitration. 
58 This refers to a tiered process where the parties begin with the arbitration and 
complete the arbitration hearing before mediation is attempted. 
59 This refers to a mediation window during an arbitration process. 
60 Dilyara Nigmatullina, “The Combined Use of Mediation and Arbitration in 
Commercial Dispute Resolution: Results from an International Study” (2016) 
33(1) J Int’l Arb 37 at 64. 
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mediation being conducted after the arbitration hearing but before 
issuing the award, and 11.1% where mediation was conducted after 
issuing the award.61 Various factors can influence the parties’ decisions 
regarding the manner in which mediation and arbitration are combined, 
including cost-effectiveness and the ability of the process to assist 
parties in preserving their relationships.62 The discussion in this section 
will touch on the perceived advantages of Med-Arb, Arb-Med and 
Arb-Med-Arb, but will focus on the ability of the combined process to 
achieve international enforceability. 
A. Med-Arb 
22 In Med-Arb, if a settlement agreement is arrived at after 
mediation, the parties then appoint an arbitrator, who may be the same 
person as the mediator, to record their settlement agreement as a 
consent arbitral award. If no settlement agreement is reached, the 
appointed arbitrator will proceed to hear the case. However, variations 
of Med-Arb such as mediation and last offer arbitration also exist, where 
if the mediation fails, each party presents the mediator-turned-arbitrator 
with a proposed ruling and the arbitrator decides between the two.63 
23 The key perceived benefit of Med-Arb is efficiency. First, the 
arbitrator is already familiar with the dispute; hence, there is no need for 
any duplication of work, additional expense or delay.64 Second, any 
mediated settlement arrived at during arbitration may swiftly be 
recorded as a consent award. Third, even where there is no settlement 
reached, previous negotiations will have helped to narrow issues and 
result in procedural measures that could lead to a more predictable and 
acceptable award.65 Another advantage of Med-Arb is its perceived 
ability to provide greater opportunity to salvage relationship concerns 
than Arb-Med.66 Because mediation takes place before arbitration, and 
                                                          
61 Dilyara Nigmatullina, “The Combined Use of Mediation and Arbitration in 
Commercial Dispute Resolution: Results from an International Study” (2016) 
33(1) J Int’l Arb 37 at 65. 
62 See Eunice Chua, “A Contribution to the Conversation on Mixing the Modes of 
Mediation and Arbitration: Of Definitional Consistency and Process Structure” 
(2018) TDM 5. 
63 Thomas J Stipanowich & Peter H Kaskell, Commercial Arbitration at Its Best: 
Successful Strategies for Business Users (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2001) 
at pp 25–26. 
64 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, “Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China” (2008) 25(4) J Int’l Arb 479 at 490. 
65 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, “Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China” (2008) 25(4) J Int’l Arb 479 at 490. 
66 Trevor Jason Stones, “Choosing between Med-Arb and Arb-Med: An Exploratory 
Study” (Master of Arts thesis, University of Victoria) (2007) <www.cedires.be/
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assuming that most disputes can be settled at mediation and that even if 
they do not mediation can help the parties to narrow their differences 
and issues in dispute, the Med-Arb process helps to avoid or minimise 
adversarial behaviour. 
24 Various international dispute resolution institutions offer a 
Med-Arb clause or have rules that provide expressly for Med-Arb, 
including the International Chamber of Commerce, the International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution, the London Court of International 
Arbitration and the Mediation Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. Many Asian dispute resolution institutions also offer 
Med-Arb services, including the Asian International Arbitration 
Centre (“AIAC”),67 Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC”),68 China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”),69 Indian Institute of Arbitration and Mediation70 and 
Vietnam International Arbitration Centre.71 Others such as the 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre offer both mediation and 
arbitration services although the rules do not provide for how both 
services can be combined. This shows that Med-Arb is perceived as 
being an attractive option in quite a number of jurisdictions although it 
is not clear how widely Med-Arb is used for international commercial 
disputes.72 
                                                                                                                               
index_files/SONES_Trevor_Jason_Choosing%20between%20med-arb%20and%20
arb-med_thesis.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2019). 
67 Rule 15 of the Asian International Arbitration Centre (“AIAC”) Arbitration Rules 
2018 provides for half of the administrative fees paid to the AIAC for mediation to 
be credited towards the AIAC administrative fees in relation to the arbitration in 
the event that parties have failed to reach a mediated settlement under the AIAC 
Mediation Rules. 
68 Article 23 of the Beijing Arbitration Commission Mediation Center Mediation 
Rules (31 August 2011; effective 28 September 2011) provides that: 
… [t]he parties can apply for arbitration to the Beijing Arbitration 
Commission by submitting an arbitration agreement and request the arbitral 
tribunal to render an arbitral award or a conciliation statement following the 
content of the settlement agreement. 
69 Article 47 of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission Arbitration Rules (adopted 4 November 2014; effective 1 January 
2015) provides for the combination of conciliation and arbitration. 
70 Rule 19 of the Indian Institute of Arbitration and Mediation (“IIAM”) Arbitration 
Rules 2017 provides for half of the administrative fee paid to IIAM for mediation 
to be credited towards the administrative fee of the arbitration where parties have 
referred their dispute to mediation under IIAM Mediation Rules and they have 
failed to reach a settlement and thereafter proceed to arbitration under the Rules. 
71 Article 29 of the Vietnam International Arbitration Centre Rules of Arbitration 
2017 allows the tribunal to conduct mediation at the parties’ request. 
72 Statistics provided by dispute resolution institutions including the Asian 
International Arbitration Centre, Beijing Arbitration Commission, China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre, International Chamber of Commerce, 
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25 Caution may be warranted because Med-Arb poses some 
difficulties in the context of international commercial disputes. There is 
first an issue of whether an award can be enforced under the New York 
Convention if the arbitrator is appointed after the dispute is resolved in 
mediation. This is because it could be argued that no “difference” existed 
between the parties to found an arbitration by the time of appointment 
of the arbitrator.73 It appears that certain jurisdictions such as New York 
and Brazil require that the arbitral tribunal be constituted prior to 
settlement of the dispute.74 Commentators examining this issue have 
come to different conclusions – that such an award is not enforceable,75 
that it is,76 or that it is not clear.77 It should further be noted that the 
New York Convention is silent on the specific question of its 
applicability to decisions that record the terms of a settlement between 
parties.78 The travaux préparatoires of the New York Convention show 
that the issue of the application of the New York Convention to consent 
awards was raised during its deliberations, but that no decision was 
made.79 
                                                                                                                               
International Centre for Dispute Resolution, Indian Institute of Arbitration and 
Mediation, London Court of International Arbitration, Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce and Vietnam International Arbitration Centre do not disclose the 
international cases that have been resolved through combining mediation and 
arbitration. 
73 Bobette Wolski, “Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less Than, Not 
Greater Than, the Sum of its Parts?” (2013) 6(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 249 at 262; 
Cyril Chern, Dispute Resolution Guides: International Commercial Mediation 
(Informa, 2008) at p 187. 
74 Donna Ross, “Med-Arb/Arb-Med: A More Efficient ADR Process or an Invitation 
to a Potential Ethical Disaster?” in Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2012 (Arthur W Rovine ed) 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at pp 362–363. 
75 Christopher Newmark & Richard Hill, “Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement 
Become an Enforceable Arbitration Award?” (2000) 16(1) Arb Int’l 81 at 81; James 
T Peter, “Med-Arb in International Arbitration” (1997) 8 Am Rev Int’l Arb 83 
at 88. 
76 Harold I Abramson, “Mining Mediation Rules for Representation Opportunities 
and Obstacles” (2004) 15 Am Rev Int’l Arb 103. 
77 Edna Sussman, “A Path Forward: A Convention for the Enforcement of Mediated 
Settlement Agreements” (2015) 6 TDM 1 at 8. 
78 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat – 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes – International Commercial Conciliation: 
Enforceability of Settlement Agreements (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.190) (13 July 2015) 
at para 19. 
79 Travaux préparatoires: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Report by the Secretary-General 
(E/2822) (31 January 1956) Annex I (Comments by Governments) at pp 7 and 10; 
Travaux préparatoires: United Nations Conference on International Commercial 
Arbitration, Consideration of the Draft Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (E/CONF.26/L.26) (27 May 1958). 
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26 As an aside, although an interpretation of the New York 
Convention could suffice to address this issue,80 a regime tailored to the 
specific concerns raised in the mediation context would better serve 
users.81 This is because the defences for challenging an arbitral award 
and a mediated settlement agreement do not always overlap. Although 
incapacity of a party would be a basis to resist enforcement in both the 
mediation and arbitration context,82 different thresholds and tests would 
apply to misconduct on the part of the mediator or arbitrator. 
Misconduct of the mediator is expressly addressed under Arts 5(1)(e) 
and 5(1)(f) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation but not under 
the New York Convention. The New York Convention addresses 
arbitrator misconduct through other defences, such as the award dealing 
with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration, or containing decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration under Art V(1)(c); the 
arbitral procedure not being in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties or the law of the country the arbitration took place under 
Art V(1)(d); or for enforcement being contrary to public policy under 
Art V(2)(b). One could also challenge an arbitral award on the basis of 
the composition of the arbitral authority not being in accordance with 
the agreement of the parties or the law of the country the arbitration 
took place under Art V(1)(d), but this is not expressly provided for in 
the context of the appointment of the mediator. 
27 Another issue with Med-Arb occurs where the mediator is the 
same person as the arbitrator. This may result in allegations of perceived 
or actual bias, for example, where information is disclosed in private 
sessions to a mediator that influences decision-making when that 
mediator sits as arbitrator.83 The knowledge that the mediator may later 
switch to the role of arbitrator may also cause parties to be wary of 
disclosing information or to treat the mediation as an early trial run of 
                                                          
80 Edna Sussman, “The New York Convention through a Mediation Prism” (2009) 
15(4) Disp Resol Mag 10 at 12–13. 
81 Edna Sussman, “A Path Forward: A Convention for the Enforcement of Mediated 
Settlement Agreements” (2015) 6 TDM 1 at 9. 
82 See Art V(1)(a) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (330 UNTS 3) (10 June 1958; entry into force 7 June 1959) 
and Art 5(1)(a) of the Convention on International Settlement Agreements 
Resulting from Mediation GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General 
Assembly, 73rd Session (20 December 2018). 
83 Bobette Wolski, “Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less Than, Not 
Greater Than, the Sum of Its Parts?” (2013) 6(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 249  
at 259–260. See also Glencot Development and Design Co Ltd v Ben Barrett & Son 
Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 384; [2001] EWHC Technology 15 where Judge Humphrey 
Lloyd QC pointed out the dangers of appearance of bias caused by one person 
wearing two hats. 
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the arbitration hearing.84 Nevertheless, this difficulty may only be a 
theoretical one in certain cultures where the arbitrator or mediator is 
regarded as an authority figure who is trusted to be capable of remaining 
impartial despite obtaining confidential information during mediation.85 
It has been argued that in societies where interpersonal relationships are 
more stable and long-lasting, procedures that allow for compromises are 
preferred, with parties seeking an arbitrator who will not only end their 
dispute but will also assist them in reaching a mutually agreeable 
solution with as little loss of face as possible.86 For example, mediation 
and arbitration are frequently combined in China,87 where the 
experience has been that combining the two makes mediation more 
likely to produce a settlement than when it is conducted separately.88 
Med-Arb as well as Arb-Med have also been described as well suited to 
meeting India’s needs.89 Domestic legislation in Hong Kong and 
Singapore offers a creative solution to the problem of confidential 
information being disclosed to the arbitrator by requiring the arbitrator 
to disclose to all the parties any information obtained through the 
mediation that the arbitrator considers is material to the arbitral 
proceeding in the event that the parties consent to the arbitrator serving 
as mediator.90 However, even if the parties are willing to accept the same 
neutral playing the role of mediator and arbitrator, there remains the 
                                                          
84 Bobette Wolski, “Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less Than, Not 
Greater Than, the Sum of its Parts?” (2013) 6(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 249  
at 259–260; Thomas J Brewer & Lawrence R Mills, “Med Arb: Combining 
Mediation and Arbitration” (1999) 54 Disp Resol J 32 at 35. 
85 Fan Kun, “An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China” (2014) 
15 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 777 at 786. 
86 Research also shows that people with a high level of power distance place less 
weight on procedural justice than on distributive justice concerns: Fan Kun, “An 
Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China” (2014) 15 Cardozo 
J Conflict Resol 777 at 786. 
87 Thomas J Stipanowich et al, “East Meets West: An International Dialogue on 
Mediation and Med-Arb in the United States and China” (2009) 9(2) Pepp Disp 
Resol LJ 379 at 398; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, “Integrating 
Mediation into Arbitration: Why It Works in China” (2008) 25(4) J Int’l Arb 479; 
Carlos de Vera, “Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence of Culture 
and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China” 
(2004) 18 Colum J Asian L 149 at 162–178; Tai-Heng Cheng & Anthony Kohtio, 
“Some Limits to Applying Chinese Med-Arb Internationally” (2009) 2(1) NY Disp 
Resol Law 95. 
88 Wang Shengchang, “CIETAC’s Perspective on Arbitration and Conciliation 
Concerning China” in New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and 
Beyond (Albert Jan van den Berg ed) (ICCA Congress Series No 12) (Kluwer Law 
International, 2005) at p 27. 
89 Sriram Panchu, “Arb-Med and Med-Arb Are Well-Suited to Meeting India’s ADR 
Needs” (2009) 2(1) NY Disp Resol Law 103 at 103. 
90 Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) s 33 (Hong Kong); International Arbitration Act 
(Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 17. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
590 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2019) 31 SAcLJ 
 
practical challenge of finding someone who is skilled both as an 
arbitrator and mediator.91 
B. Arb-Med 
28 There are various forms of Arb-Med, including: (a) sealed 
arbitration award and mediation, where the arbitrator prepares an award 
which remains under seal and takes on the role of mediator after that; if 
the parties fail to reach a settlement agreement, the earlier drafted award 
is issued; and (b) Arb-Med-Arb, where mediation is attempted after 
arbitration commences and, if unsuccessful, the dispute returns to 
arbitration.92 
29 The largest problem with the sealed arbitration award and 
mediation process is that unless the arbitration proceedings are quickly 
concluded and straightforward, there could be substantial and 
unnecessary costs incurred by everyone involved – the parties, counsel, 
and the arbitrator or mediator.93 The rapport of the parties with the 
mediator and with each other may also be strained because of what 
transpired during the adversarial arbitration process, making mediation 
more difficult.94 On the other hand, empirical research of students 
engaged in simulated Arb-Med demonstrates that this sealed arbitration 
award and mediation process produced settlement in the mediation 
phase more frequently and achieved settlements of higher joint benefit 
than a Med-Arb process.95 This is likely due to psychological reasons 
such as the desire to reduce outcome uncertainty in Arb-Med, and 
greater willingness to exchange information in Arb-Med since there can 
be no impact on the sealed arbitral award.96 The fact that the arbitrator 
                                                          
91 Lucy Greenwood, “A Window of Opportunity? Building a Short Period of Time 
into Arbitral Rules in Order for Parties to Explore Settlement” (2011) 27(2) Arb 
Int’l 199 at 208. 
92 Kathleen M Scanlon & Kathy A Bryan, “Will the Next Generation of Dispute 
Resolution Clause Drafting Include Model Arb-Med Clauses?” in Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: Fordham Papers 2012 (Arthur 
Rovine ed) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at p 430. 
93 Bobette Wolski, “Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less Than, Not 
Greater Than, the Sum of its Parts?” (2013) 6(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 249  
at 263–264. 
94 Eunice Chua, “The Future of International Mediated Settlement Agreements: Of 
Conventions, Challenges and Choices” (2015) Tan Pan Online: A Chinese-English 
Journal on Negotiation 1. 
95 Donald E Conlon, Henry Moon & K Yee Ng, “Putting the Cart before the Horse: 
The Benefits of Arbitrating before Mediating” (2002) 87(5) Journal of Applied 
Psychology 978. 
96 Donald E Conlon, Henry Moon & K Yee Ng, “Putting the Cart before the Horse: 
The Benefits of Arbitrating before Mediating” (2002) 87(5) Journal of Applied 
Psychology 978 at 979. 
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already determines the award before the mediation also makes this 
process more acceptable from a conflict of interest perspective when the 
mediator and arbitrator are the same person. However, this study also 
showed that Arb-Med produced slower resolutions and did not work to 
reduce pre-dispute measures of disputant outcome expectations,97 
validating the earlier observation about the “chilling effect” of 
arbitration on negotiation behaviour.98 
30 Accordingly, Arb-Med may not be an effective process for the 
majority of international commercial disputes, which would usually 
involve evidence and witnesses from various jurisdictions, thus leading 
to a costly arbitration component. Such disputes may also benefit from 
being resolved more quickly to avoid jeopardising ongoing business 
projects or relationships and a full-blown arbitration hearing before 
mediation would not favour a speedy resolution. 
C. Arb-Med-Arb 
31 Arb-Med-Arb can be viewed as a form of Arb-Med where the 
mediation takes place before the completion of the substantive 
arbitration hearings. If parties are able to come to a settlement after 
mediation, they may return to the arbitral tribunal to have their 
settlement agreement recorded as a consent arbitral award. If not, the 
matter proceeds with arbitration. Despite the theoretical uncertainties, 
there is general agreement that a consent arbitral award obtained 
through Arb-Med-Arb will likely be enforceable under the New York 
Convention.99 The Arb-Med-Arb process avoids the problem that 
Med-Arb presents because arbitration is commenced in the traditional 
way, while “differences” still remain between the parties that can be 
submitted to arbitration. Enforceability is therefore Arb-Med-Arb’s 
greatest advantage. Arb-Med-Arb could also possibly be effective in 
preserving the relationship between parties (or at least preventing it 
from worsening), especially where mediation is done at an early stage of 
the arbitration process.100 
                                                          
97 Donald E Conlon, Henry Moon & K Yee Ng, “Putting the Cart before the Horse: 
The Benefits of Arbitrating before Mediating” (2002) 87(5) Journal of Applied 
Psychology 978 at 983. 
98 See Thomas A Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations: From 
Theory to Policy and Practice (RD Irwin, 1980) at p 291. 
99 Edna Sussman, “The New York Convention through a Mediation Prism” (2009) 
15(4) Disp Resol Mag 10 at 12; Bobette Wolski, “Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): 
A Whole Which Is Less Than, Not Greater Than, the Sum of its Parts?” (2013) 
6(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 249 at 262. 
100 Eunice Chua, “A Contribution to the Conversation on Mixing the Modes of 
Mediation and Arbitration: Of Definitional Consistency and Process Structure” 
(2018) TDM 5. 
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32 On the other hand, Arb-Med-Arb’s disadvantages are that it 
tends to be costlier and less efficient than Med-Arb, especially where 
there is no settlement. Even where there is a settlement, should different 
institutions or persons be involved, additional costs such as filing fees 
and preparation fees may be incurred. Where the arbitrator and the 
mediator are the same, there could also be problems of potential bias 
and parties refraining from sharing confidences or making use of the 
mediation process for collateral purposes.101 
33 In the Hong Kong case of Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd,102 
a challenge was made to a Mainland China arbitral award on various 
grounds, including that of apparent bias arising from what a Xian Court 
had found to be an unsuccessful mediation by the arbitral tribunal. The 
circumstances of the mediation that were said to give rise to apparent 
bias included: (a) the tribunal deciding to make a proposal to the parties 
to settle their dispute by payment of a certain sum by the respondents to 
the applicants; (b) the tribunal appointing the applicant-nominated 
arbitrator and a third party from the Xian Arbitration Commission to 
contact the parties with this proposal; and (c) the conveyance of the 
proposal over dinner at a hotel where not all the parties were present.103 
The Hong Kong Court of First Instance refused enforcement of the 
award but was later overturned by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, 
where Hon Tang VP remarked that refusing enforcement of an arbitral 
award on the basis that it would be contrary to the fundamental 
conceptions of morality and justice of the forum:104 
… does not mean, for example, [that] if it is common for mediation to 
be conducted over dinner at a hotel in Xian, an award would not be 
enforced in Hong Kong, because, in Hong Kong, such conduct, might 
give rise to an appearance of apparent bias. 
This case illustrates not only how the issue of apparent bias may arise 
during enforcement of awards obtained through a hybrid process but 
also the importance of the enforcing court being accepting of cultural 
variance in mediation practice. 
34 Nevertheless, where sufficient care is taken, Arb-Med-Arb may 
still be attractive for parties concerned about international enforceability 
                                                          
101 Ellen E Deason, “Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the Same 
Neutral: A Framework for Judicial Review” (2013) 5 YB Arb & Mediation 219 
at 223. 
102 [2011] HKCA 489; [2012] 1 HKLRD 627. 
103 See Friven Yeoh & Desmond Ang, “Reflections on Gao Haiyan – Of ‘Arb-Med’, 
‘Waivers’, and Cultural Contextualisation of Public Policy Arguments” (2012) 
29(3) J Int’l Arb 285 for a helpful summary and commentary. 
104 Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd [2011] HKCA 489; [2012] 1 HKLRD 627 
at [105]. 
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of their mediated settlement agreements and maintaining business 
relationships, and who desire a comprehensive process that responds to 
the potential failure of mediation to bring about full settlement. 
35 At present, Arb-Med-Arb appears most prevalent in Europe and 
Asia. In Europe, German and Swiss arbitrators have been observed to 
adopt a more settlement-friendly approach.105 Arb-Med-Arb is also 
permitted by the rules of institutions like the German Arbitration 
Institute106 and the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution.107 In Asia, it 
is common for Mainland Chinese institutions such as CIETAC and BAC 
to have rules that permit Arb-Med-Arb,108 and for arbitrators to engage 
in conciliation. Other Asian institutions like the AIAC publicises an 
Arb-Med-Arb clause although there are no specific rules relating to this 
process. 
36 The most regulated Arb-Med-Arb procedure on offer by a 
dispute resolution service provider is the Arb-Med-Arb service jointly 
offered by the Singapore International Mediation Centre (“SIMC”) and 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”).109 The hallmarks 
of this service are, first, a procedural framework to govern the transition 
between arbitration and mediation as well as financial matters in a 
document called the Arb-Med-Arb Protocol (“the AMA Protocol”). 
Under the AMA Protocol, arbitration is commenced by filing a notice of 
arbitration in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules (either 
SIAC Arbitration Rules110 or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).111 An 
arbitral tribunal is appointed and after the exchange of the notice of 
arbitration and response to the notice of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal 
stays the arbitration and the matter is submitted to SIMC for mediation. 
                                                          
105 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a 
Transnational Standard” (2009) 25(2) Arb Int’l 187. 
106 Article 27.4 of the German Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules 2018 provides 
that the tribunal shall discuss with the parties at a case management conference the 
possibility of using mediation or other method of amicable settlement; Art 41 
provides for the recording of a consent settlement agreement by the tribunal. 
107 Article 24 of the Swiss Rules of Commercial Mediation (April 2007; reprinted 
2013) refers to mediation during the course of arbitral proceedings. 
108 Eg, Art 43(1) of the Beijing Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules states that 
during the arbitral proceedings: 
… the parties may enter into a voluntary settlement agreement or may apply 
to the Mediation Center of the BAC (the ‘Mediation Center’) for mediation by 
the mediators of the Mediation Center in accordance with the Mediation 
Rules of the Mediation Center of the BAC. 
109 See Constance Castres Saint Martin, “Arb-Med-Arb Service in Singapore 
International Mediation Centre: A Hotfix to the Pitfalls of Multi-Tiered Clauses” 
[2015] Asian JM 35 at 44–46. 
110 6th Ed, 1 August 2016. 
111 GA Res 68/109, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session 
(16 December 2013). 
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The mediation will be completed within eight weeks from the date it 
commences unless the Registrar of SIAC in consultation with SIMC 
extends the time. The AMA Protocol further provides for the parties to 
pay combined fees and deposits to SIAC (the apportionment between 
SIAC and SIMC is dealt with institutionally). There is minimal 
additional cost difference between a pure arbitration at SIAC and the 
Arb-Med-Arb service. 
37 Second, there is independent institutional support in the form 
of case management as well as appointment of suitable arbitrators and 
mediators for each case from international panels. The mediator and 
arbitrator will generally be different persons unless the parties expressly 
agree otherwise. 
38 Finally, an important feature of the AMA Protocol is a deeming 
provision that the parties agree that any dispute settled by mediation at 
SIMC “shall fall within the scope of their arbitration agreement”.112 This 
allows the mediation to globally resolve any issues between the parties 
that may not strictly arise from the contract containing the arbitration 
agreement. The SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb service has been described 
as “combin[ing] the best of both systems, granting the efficiency of 
mediation and the certainty and enforceability of an arbitral award”.113 
Although there are issues that remain to be clarified with the AMA 
Protocol, including whether jurisdictional challenges may be made after 
an arbitration has been stayed and referred to mediation at SIAC,114 the 
AMA Protocol does offer a generally clear framework for mediation to 
be conducted in the context of an international arbitration. 
39 On balance, using the arbitration route to enforce international 
mediation settlements is superior to the route of a court judgment due 
to the large number of countries that will recognise and enforce consent 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention. However, there remain 
problems that could potentially surface depending on the precise way 
mediation and arbitration are combined.115 
                                                          
112 Singapore International Mediation Centre, “SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol” 
at para 1 http://simc.com.sg/dispute-resolution/arb-med-arb/ (accessed 
15 January 2019). 
113 Christopher Boog & Elisabeth Leimbacher, “The Singapore International 
Mediation Centre and the New AMA Procedure – Finally What Users Have 
Always Wanted?” Schellenberg Wittmer Newsletter (January 2015) at p 3. 
114 See the contrasting views expressed in Cameron Ford, “Purpose over Process – 
Empowering the SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol” Singapore Law Gazette 
(June 2018); and Paul Tan & Kevin Tan, “Kinks in the SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb 
Protocol” Singapore Law Gazette (January 2018). 
115 Edna Sussman, “The Final Step: Issues in Enforcing the Mediation Settlement 
Agreement” in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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III. Enforcement through notarisation 
40 Mediated settlement agreements may, finally, be enforced 
through being transposed into a notarial deed. This path of enforcement 
is commonly available in civil law countries.116 For example, in 
Germany, parties may include the mediated settlement agreement in a 
public document drawn up by a German notary and add a declaration 
by the party concerned, in which the party agrees to submit to 
immediate enforcement in relation to an obligation resulting from that 
agreement.117 In Spain, legislation118 provides for mediation agreements 
to be recorded in a public instrument in the presence of a notary public 
and to meet certain requirements before they may be enforceable.119 In 
Austria, if a party wants to enforce a right arising out of a contract, 
including mediated settlement agreements, they may convert their 
agreement into a “vollstreckbarer Notariatsakt” according to s 3 of 
Austria’s Notarial Code.120 While the legal peculiarities of these notarial 
deeds vary according to jurisdiction, they do, generally speaking, share a 
number of features, including that they must be in writing and signed by 
the parties, and there may be a need for it to be signed by witnesses, 
lawyers, notaries, or any combination of these parties.121 There may or 
may not be a requirement that parties make mutual concessions for the 
deeds to be valid.122 
41 At common law, mediated settlement agreements may also be 
made into a deed. However, this is different from the process of 
notarisation in civil law countries as deeds are not in themselves 
enforceable. The main reason of embodying a mediated settlement 
agreement in the form of a deed is that deeds do not require 
consideration, whereas ordinary contracts do.123 The recitals at the 
                                                                                                                               
The Fordham Papers 2008 (Arthur W Rovine ed) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009) at p 343. 
116 Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009) at p 305. 
117 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat – Compilation of Comments by Governments 
(A/CN.9/846/Add.3) (4 June 2015) at pp 13–14 and 16. 
118 Spain’s Act No 5/2012 of 6 July 2012 on mediation in civil and commercial matters 
and Act No 1/2000 of 7 January 2000 on civil procedure. 
119 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat – Compilation of Comments by Governments 
(A/CN.9/846/Add.3) (4 June 2015) at pp 13–14 and 16. 
120 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat – Settlement of Commercial disputes, 
Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Resulting from International Commercial 
Conciliation/Mediation (A/CN.9/846) (27 March 2015) at p 5. 
121 Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009) at pp 305–306. 
122 Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009) at pp 306–307. 
123 David Spencer & Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at p 356. 
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beginning of a deed that set out a brief history of the dispute between 
the parties and the agreed solution may also be helpful to provide 
context for the agreement.124 
42 Because notarisation is purely a matter of domestic law, the 
requirements of which vary from country to country, and is essentially 
available only in civil law jurisdictions, this method of enforcement is 
also of limited usefulness in the international context, particularly where 
there are multiple parties from different jurisdictions that are a mix of 
common and civil law traditions. It is further uncertain if the benefit of 
notarisation would extend to mediations that do not take place within 
the country in question. Accordingly, this option of an enforcement is 
probably not a very useful one for consideration by international users, 
although it may be of some utility in the EU, especially post-Brexit. 
IV. Conclusion 
43 The enforcement of international mediated settlement 
agreements without an international instrument is challenging. Of the 
three generally available options canvassed in this piece, enforcement as 
an arbitral award seems to emerge as the best choice simply because it 
depends on the widely ratified New York Convention. Although there is 
promise in terms of the development of a multilateral instrument for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it will take time 
before a convention can be finalised. Unsurprisingly, the combination of 
mediation and arbitration is on an upward trend.125 Although this 
option may be accompanied by some risks and difficulty, particularly in 
the manner in which mediation and arbitration are combined and 
whether the same neutral is used for both parts of the combined 
process, these can be minimised to some degree with a well-drafted 
dispute resolution clause and using the Arb-Med-Arb or Arb-Med 
                                                          
124 David Spencer & Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at p 357. 
125 See Eunice Chua, “A Contribution to the Conversation on Mixing the Modes of 
Mediation and Arbitration: Of Definitional Consistency and Process Structure” 
(2018) TDM 5, citing International Mediation Institute, “Cumulated Data Results 
March 2016 – September 2017”, Global Pound Conference Series 2016–2017 
<http://globalpound.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-09-18-Final-GPC-
Series-Results-Cumulated-Votes-from-the-GPC-App-Mar.-2016-Sep.-2017.pdf> 
(accessed 15 January 2019); Christopher Bloch et al, “Drafting Step Clauses: An 
Empirical Look at Their Practicality and Legality” (Pace Institute of International 
Commercial Law) http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/newsletter/Pace_IACCM_
Step_Clause_Drafting_Manual.pdf (accessed 15 January 2019); and Queen Mary 
University of London School of International Arbitration, “2018 International 
Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration” (2018). 
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procedure (although there may be an issue of cost-effectiveness with the 
latter). 
44 Nevertheless, in terms of certainty and simplicity of 
enforcement requirements and procedure, the existing methods of 
enforcing international mediated settlement agreements pale in 
comparison with enforcement under the Singapore Convention on 
Mediation which provides a clear application procedure, and states the 
requirements for enforcement, as well as the grounds to refuse 
enforcement. This author is optimistic that the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation, combined with educational and other policy initiatives to 
inform and “nudge” users,126 would be an important instrument to 
promote the use of international mediation for the benefit of 
commercial parties and international trade flows. 
 
                                                          
126 Nadja Alexander, “Nudging Users towards Cross-border Mediation: Is It Really 
about Harmonized Enforcement Regulation?” (2014) 7(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 405. 
